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Abstract—Wireless Sensor networks (WSN) is an emerging 
technology and have great potential to be employed in 
critical situations like battlefields and commercial 
applications such as building, traffic surveillance, habitat 
monitoring and smart homes and many more scenarios. One 
of the major challenges wireless sensor networks face today 
is security. While the deployment of sensor nodes in an 
unattended environment makes the networks vulnerable to a 
variety of potential attacks, the inherent power and memory 
limitations of sensor nodes makes conventional security 
solutions unfeasible. The sensing technology combined with 
processing power and wireless communication makes it 
profitable for being exploited in great quantity in future. 
The wireless communication technology also acquires 
various types of security threats. This paper discusses a wide 
variety of attacks in WSN and their classification 
mechanisms and different securities available to handle 
them including the challenges faced. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
    Basically, sensor networks are application 
dependent. Sensor networks are primarily designed for 
real-time collection and analysis of low level data in 
hostile environments. For this reason they are well suited 
to a substantial amount of monitoring and surveillance 
applications. Popular wireless sensor network applications 
include wildlife monitoring, bushfire response, military 
command, intelligent communications, industrial quality 
control, observation of critical infrastructures, smart 
buildings, distributed robotics, traffic monitoring, 
examining human heart rates etc. Majority of the sensor 
network are deployed in hostile environments with active 
intelligent opposition. Hence security is a crucial issue.  
One obvious example is battlefield applications where 
there is a pressing need for secrecy of location and 
resistance to subversion and destruction of the network. 
Less obvious but just as important security dependent 
applications include: 
• Disasters: In many disaster scenarios, especially 
those induced by terrorist activities, it may be 
necessary to protect the location of casualties from 
unauthorized disclosure 
• Public Safety: In applications where chemical, 
biological or other environmental threats are 
monitored, it is vital that the availability of the 
network is never threatened. Attacks causing false 
alarms may lead to panic responses or even worse 
total disregard for the signals. 
• Home Healthcare: In such applications, privacy 
protection is essential. Only authorized users 
should be able to query and monitor the network. 
The major contribution of this paper includes 
classification of security attacks, security mechanisms and 
challenges in Wireless Sensor Networks. Section 2 gives 
the detailed information about the security goals in 
Wireless Sensor Networks. Security attacks and their 
classification are discussed in section 3. Section 4 
discusses about the various security mechanisms. Major 
challenges faced are given in Section 5 followed by the 
conclusion section. 
II. SECURITY GOALS FOR SENSOR NETWORKS 
As the sensor networks can also operate in an adhoc 
manner the security goals cover both those of the 
traditional networks and goals suited to the unique 
constraints of adhoc sensor networks. The security goals 
are classified as primary and secondary [5]. The primary 
goals are known as standard security goals such as 
Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication and Availability 
(CIAA). The secondary goals are Data Freshness, Self-
Organization, Time Synchronization and Secure 
Localization. 
 
The primary goals are: 
A. Data Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is the ability to conceal messages from 
a passive attacker so that any message communicated via 
the sensor network remains confidential. This is the most 
important issue in network security. A sensor node should 
not reveal its data to the neighbors. 
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B. Data Authentication 
Authentication ensures the reliability of the message by 
identifying its origin. Attacks in sensor networks do not 
just involve the alteration of packets; adversaries can also 
inject additional false packets [14]. Data authentication 
verifies the identity of the senders and receivers. Data 
authentication is achieved through symmetric or 
asymmetric mechanisms where sending and receiving 
nodes share secret keys. Due to the wireless nature of the 
media and the unattended nature of sensor networks, it is 
extremely challenging to ensure authentication. 
C. Data Integrity 
Data integrity in sensor networks is needed to ensure 
the reliability of the data and refers to the ability to 
confirm that a message has not been tampered with, 
altered or changed. Even if the network has confidentiality 
measures, there is still a possibility that the data integrity 
has been compromised by alterations. The integrity of the 
network will be in trouble when: 
• A malicious node present in the network injects 
false data. 
• Unstable conditions due to wireless channel cause 
damage or loss of data.[4] 
D. Data Availability 
Availability determines whether a node has the ability to 
use the resources and whether the network is available for 
the messages to communicate. However, failure of the 
base station or cluster leader’s availability will eventually 
threaten the entire sensor network. Thus availability is of 
primary importance for maintaining an operational 
network. 
 
 The Secondary goals are:  
E. Data Freshness 
Even if confidentiality and data integrity are assured, there 
is a need to ensure the freshness of each message. 
Informally, data freshness [4] suggests that the data is 
recent, and it ensures that no old messages have been 
replayed. To solve this problem a nonce, or another time-
related counter, can be added into the packet to ensure data 
freshness. 
F.  Self-Organization 
A wireless sensor network is a typically an ad hoc 
network, which requires every sensor node be independent 
and flexible enough to be self-organizing and self-healing 
according to different situations. There is no fixed 
infrastructure available for the purpose of network 
management in a sensor network. This inherent feature 
brings a great challenge to wireless sensor network 
security. If self-organization is lacking in a sensor network, 
the damage resulting from an attack or even the risky 
environment may be devastating. 
G. Time Synchronization 
Most sensor network applications rely on some form of 
time synchronization. Furthermore, sensors may wish to 
compute the end-to-end delay of a packet as it travels 
between two pairwise sensors. A more collaborative 
sensor network may require group synchronization [4] for 
tracking applications. 
H. Secure Localization 
Often, the utility of a sensor network will rely on its 
ability to accurately and automatically locate each sensor 
in the network. A sensor network designed to locate faults 
will need accurate location information in order to 
pinpoint the location of a fault. Unfortunately, an attacker 
can easily manipulate nonsecured location information by 
reporting false signal strengths, replaying signals. 
 
This Section has discussed about the security goals that 
are widely available for wireless sensor networks and the 
next section explains about the attacks that commonly 
occur on wireless sensor networks.  
III. ATTACKS ON SENSOR NETWORKS 
Wireless Sensor networks are vulnerable to security 
attacks due to the broadcast nature of the transmission 
medium. Furthermore, wireless sensor networks have an 
additional vulnerability because nodes are often placed in 
a hostile or dangerous environment where they are not 
physically protected. Basically attacks are classified as 
active attacks and passive attacks. Figure1 shows the 
classification of attacks under general categories and 
Figure 2 shows the attacks classification on WSN.
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Figure 1.  General Classification of Security Attacks 
 
Figure 2.  Classification of Security Attacks on WSN 
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A. Passive Attacks 
The monitoring and listening of the communication 
channel by unauthorized attackers are known as passive 
attack. The Attacks against privacy is passive in nature. 
1) Attacks against Privacy 
The main privacy problem is not that sensor networks 
enable the collection of information. In fact, much 
information from sensor networks could probably be 
collected through direct site surveillance. Rather, sensor 
networks intensify the privacy problem because they make 
large volumes of information easily available through 
remote access. Hence, adversaries need not be physically 
present to maintain surveillance. They can gather 
information at low-risk in anonymous manner. Some of 
the more common attacks[8] against sensor privacy are: 
• Monitor and Eavesdropping: This is the most 
common attack to privacy. By snooping to the 
data, the adversary could easily discover the 
communication contents. When the traffic conveys 
the control information about the sensor network 
configuration, which contains potentially more 
detailed information than accessible through the 
location server, the eavesdropping can act 
effectively against the privacy protection. 
• Traffic Analysis: Even when the messages 
transferred are encrypted, it still leaves a high 
possibility analysis of the communication patterns. 
Sensor activities can potentially reveal enough 
information to enable an adversary to cause 
malicious harm to the sensor network. 
• Camouflage Adversaries: One can insert their 
node or compromise the nodes to hide in the 
sensor network. After that these nodes can copy as 
a normal node to attract the packets, then misroute 
the packets, conducting the privacy analysis. 
B. Active Attacks 
The unauthorized attackers monitors, listens to and 
modifies the data stream in the communication channel are 
known as active attack. The following attacks are active in 
nature. 
1. Routing Attacks in Sensor Networks 
2. Denial of Service Attacks 
3. Node Subversion 
4. Node Malfunction 
5. Node Outage 
6. Physical Attacks 
7. Message Corruption 
8. False Node 
9. Node Replication Attacks 
10. Passive Information Gathering 
 
1) Routing Attacks in Sensor Networks 
The attacks which act on the network layer are called 
routing attacks. The following are the attacks that happen 
while routing the messages. 
a) Spoofed, altered and replayed routing 
information 
• An unprotected ad hoc routing is vulnerable to 
these types of attacks, as every node acts as a 
router, and can therefore directly affect routing 
information. 
• Create routing loops 
• Extend or shorten service routes 
• Generate false error messages 
• Increase end-to-end latency [3] 
b)  Selective Forwarding 
A malicious node can selectively drop only certain 
packets. Especially effective if combined with an attack 
that gathers much traffic via the node. In sensor networks 
it is assumed that nodes faithfully forward received 
messages. But some compromised node might refuse to 
forward packets, however neighbors might start using 
another route.[3] 
c) Sinkhole Attack 
Attracting traffic to a specific node in called sinkhole 
attack. In this attack, the adversary’s goal is to attract 
nearly all the traffic from a particular area through a 
compromised node. Sinkhole attacks typically work by 
making a compromised node look especially attractive to 
surrounding nodes. [3] 
d) Sybil Attacks  
A single node duplicates itself and presented in the 
multiple locations. The Sybil attack targets fault tolerant 
schemes such as distributed storage, multipath routing and 
topology maintenance. In a Sybil attack, a single node 
presents multiple identities to other nodes in the network. 
Authentication and encryption techniques can prevent an 
outsider to launch a Sybil attack on the sensor network.[3] 
e) Wormholes Attacks 
In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or 
bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them to 
another location, and retransmits them into the network.[3] 
f) HELLO flood attacks 
An attacker sends or replays a routing protocol’s 
HELLO packets from one node to another with more 
energy. This attack uses HELLO packets as a weapon to 
convince the sensors in WSN. In this type of attack an 
attacker with a high radio transmission range and 
processing power sends HELLO packets to a number of 
sensor nodes that are isolated in a large area within a 
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WSN. The sensors are thus influenced that the adversary is 
their neighbor. As a result, while sending the information 
to the base station, the victim nodes try to go through the 
attacker as they know that it is their neighbor and are 
ultimately spoofed by the attacker.[3] 
2) Denial of Service 
Denial of Service (DoS) is produced by the 
unintentional failure of nodes or malicious action. DoS 
attack is meant not only for the adversary’s attempt to 
subvert, disrupt, or destroy a network, but also for any 
event that diminishes a network’s capability to provide a 
service. In wireless sensor networks, several types of DoS 
attacks in different layers might be performed. At physical 
layer the DoS attacks could be jamming and tampering, at 
link layer, collision, exhaustion and unfairness, at network 
layer, neglect and greed, homing, misdirection, black holes 
and at transport layer this attack could be performed by 
malicious flooding and de-synchronization. The 
mechanisms to prevent DoS attacks include payment for 
network resources, pushback, strong authentication and 
identification of traffic.[2] 
3)  Node Subversion 
Capture of a node may reveal its information including 
disclosure of cryptographic keys and thus compromise the 
whole sensor network. A particular sensor might be 
captured, and information (key) stored on it might be 
obtained by an adversary. [6] 
4)  Node Malfunction 
A malfunctioning node will generate inaccurate data 
that could expose the integrity of sensor network 
especially if it is a data-aggregating node such as a cluster 
leader [6]. 
5)  Node Outage 
Node outage is the situation that occurs when a node 
stops its function. In the case where a cluster leader stops 
functioning, the sensor network protocols should be robust 
enough to mitigate the effects of node outages by 
providing an alternate route [6]. 
6) Physical Attacks 
Sensor networks typically operate in hostile outdoor 
environments. In such environments, the small form factor 
of the sensors, coupled with the unattended and distributed 
nature of their deployment make them highly susceptible 
to physical attacks, i.e., threats due to physical node 
destructions. Unlike many other attacks mentioned above, 
physical attacks destroy sensors permanently, so the losses 
are irreversible. For instance, attackers can extract 
cryptographic secrets, tamper with the associated circuitry, 
modify programming in the sensors, or replace them with 
malicious sensors under the control of the attacker. 
 
7)  Message Corruption 
Any modification of the content of a message by an 
attacker compromises its integrity.[9] 
8) False Node 
A false node involves the addition of a node by an 
adversary and causes the injection of malicious data. An 
intruder might add a node to the system that feeds false 
data or prevents the passage of true data. Insertion of 
malicious node is one of the most dangerous attacks that 
can occur. Malicious code injected in the network could 
spread to all nodes, potentially destroying the whole 
network, or even worse, taking over the network on behalf 
of an adversary.[9] 
9)  Node Replication Attacks 
Conceptually, a node replication attack is quite simple; 
an attacker seeks to add a node to an existing sensor 
network by copying the nodeID of an existing sensor node. 
A node replicated in this approach can severely disrupt a 
sensor network’s performance. Packets can be corrupted or 
even misrouted. This can result in a disconnected network, 
false sensor readings, etc. If an attacker can gain physical 
access to the entire network he can copy cryptographic 
keys to the replicated sensor nodes. By inserting the 
replicated nodes at specific network points, the attacker 
could easily manipulate a specific segment of the network, 
perhaps by disconnecting it altogether.[1] 
10) Passive Information Gathering 
An adversary with powerful resources can collect 
information from the sensor networks if it is not encrypted. 
An intruder with an appropriately powerful receiver and 
well-designed antenna can easily pick off the data stream. 
Interception of the messages containing the physical 
locations of sensor nodes allows an attacker to locate the 
nodes and destroy them. Besides the locations of sensor 
nodes, an adversary can observe the application specific 
content of messages including message IDs, timestamps 
and other fields. To minimize the threats of passive 
information gathering, strong encryption techniques needs 
to be used.[8] 
This section explained about the attacks and their 
classification that widely happens on wireless sensor 
networks. The next section discusses about the security 
mechanisms that are used to handle the attacks.  
IV. SECURITY MECHANISM 
The security mechanisms are actually used to detect, 
prevent and recover from the security attacks. A wide 
variety of security schemes can be invented to counter 
malicious attacks and these can be categorized as high-
level and low-level. Figure 3 shows the order of security 
mechanisms. 
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Figure3: Security mechanisms 
A. Low-Level Mechanism 
Low-level security primitives for securing sensor 
networks includes, 
1. Key establishment and trust setup 
2. Secrecy and authentication 
3. Privacy 
4. Robustness to communication denial of service 
5. Secure routing 
6. Resilience to node capture 
1) Key establishment and trust setup 
The primary requirement of setting up the sensor network 
is the establishment of cryptographic keys.  Generally the 
sensor devices have limited computational power and the 
public key cryptographic primitives are too expensive to 
follow. Key-establishment techniques need to scale to 
networks with hundreds or thousands of nodes. In addition, 
the communication patterns of sensor networks differ from 
traditional networks; sensor nodes may need to set up keys 
with their neighbors and with data aggregation nodes. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that attackers who 
compromised sufficiently and many nodes could also 
reconstruct the complete key pool and break the scheme.[1] 
2) Secrecy and authentication. 
Most of the sensor network applications require 
protection against eavesdropping, injection, and modification 
of packets. Cryptography is the standard defense. 
Remarkable system trade-offs arise when incorporating 
cryptography into sensor networks. For point-to-point 
communication[12], end-to-end cryptography achieves a 
high level of security but requires that keys be set up among 
all end points and be incompatible with passive participation 
and local broadcast. Link-layer cryptography with a network 
wide shared key simplifies key setup and supports passive 
participation and local broadcast, but intermediate nodes 
might eavesdrop or alter messages. The earliest sensor 
networks are likely to use link layer cryptography, because 
this approach provides the greatest ease of deployment 
among currently available network cryptographic 
approaches.[6] 
3) Privacy 
Like other traditional networks, the sensor networks have 
also force privacy concerns. Initially the sensor networks are 
deployed for legitimate purpose might subsequently be used 
in unanticipated ways. Providing awareness of the presence 
of sensor nodes and data acquisition is particularly important. 
[1] 
4) Robustness to communication denial of service 
An adversary attempts to disrupt the network’s operation 
by broadcasting a high-energy signal. If the transmission is 
powerful enough, the entire system’s communication could 
be jammed. More sophisticated attacks are also possible; the 
adversary might inhibit communication by violating the 
802.11 medium access control (MAC) protocol by, say, 
transmitting while a neighbor is also transmitting or by 
continuously requesting channel access with a request-to-
send signal.[1] 
5) Secure routing 
Routing and data forwarding is a crucial service for 
enabling communication in sensor networks. Unfortunately, 
current routing protocols suffer from many security 
vulnerabilities. For example, an attacker might launch denial-
of-service attacks on the routing protocol, preventing 
communication. The simplest attacks involve injecting 
malicious routing information into the network, resulting in 
routing inconsistencies. Simple authentication might guard 
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against injection attacks, but some routing protocols are 
susceptible to replay by the attacker of legitimate routing 
messages. [6] 
6) Resilience to node capture 
One of the most challenging issues in sensor networks is 
resiliency against node capture attacks. In most applications, 
sensor nodes are likely to be placed in locations easily 
accessible to attackers. Such exposure raises the possibility 
that an attacker might capture sensor nodes, extract 
cryptographic secrets, modify their programming, or replace 
them with malicious nodes under the control of the attacker. 
Tamper-resistant packaging may be one defense, but it’s 
expensive, since current technology does not provide a high 
level of security. Algorithmic solutions to the problem of 
node capture are preferable.[1] 
B. High-Level Mechanism 
High-level security mechanisms for securing sensor 
networks, includes secure group management, intrusion 
detection, and secure data aggregation. 
1) Secure group management 
Each and every node in a wireless sensor network is 
limited in its computing and communication capabilities. 
However, interesting in-network data aggregation and 
analysis can be performed by groups of nodes. For example, 
a group of nodes might be responsible for jointly tracking a 
vehicle through the network. The actual nodes comprising 
the group may change continuously and quickly. Many other 
key services in wireless sensor networks are also performed 
by groups. Consequently, secure protocols for group 
management are required, securely admitting new group 
members and supporting secure group communication. The 
outcome of the group key computation is normally 
transmitted to a base station. The output must be 
authenticated to ensure it comes from a valid group. [1] 
2) Intrusion detection 
Wireless sensor networks are susceptible to many forms 
of intrusion. Wireless sensor networks require a solution that 
is fully distributed and inexpensive in terms of 
communication, energy, and memory requirements. The use 
of secure groups may be a promising approach for 
decentralized intrusion detection.[1] 
3) Secure data aggregation 
One advantage of a wireless sensor network is the fine-
grain sensing that large and dense sets of nodes can provide. 
The sensed values must be aggregated to avoid 
overwhelming amounts of traffic back to the base station. 
For example, the system may average the temperature of a 
geographic region, combine sensor values to compute the 
location and velocity of a moving object, or aggregate data to 
avoid false alarms in real-world event detection. Depending 
on the architecture of the wireless sensor network, 
aggregation may take place in many places in the network. 
All aggregation locations must be secured.[6] 
 
V. CHALLENGES OF SENSOR NETWORKS 
The nature of large, ad-hoc, wireless sensor networks 
presents significant challenges in designing security 
schemes. A wireless sensor network is a special network 
which has many constraint compared to a traditional 
computer network.  
A. Wireless Medium 
The wireless medium is inherently less secure because its 
broadcast nature makes eavesdropping simple. Any 
transmission can easily be intercepted, altered, or replayed 
by an adversary. The wireless medium allows an attacker to 
easily intercept valid packets and easily inject malicious 
ones. Although this problem is not unique to sensor 
networks, traditional solutions must be adapted to efficiently 
execute on sensor networks. [7] 
B. Ad-Hoc Deployment 
The ad-hoc nature of sensor networks means no structure 
can be statically defined. The network topology is always 
subject to changes due to node failure, addition, or mobility. 
Nodes may be deployed by airdrop, so nothing is known of 
the topology prior to deployment. Since nodes may fail or be 
replaced the network must support self-configuration. 
Security schemes must be able to operate within this 
dynamic environment.  
C. Hostile Environment 
The next challenging factor is the hostile environment in 
which sensor nodes function. Motes face the possibility of 
destruction or capture by attackers. Since nodes may be in a 
hostile environment, attackers can easily gain physical access 
to the devices. Attackers may capture a node, physically 
disassemble it, and extract from it valuable information (e.g. 
cryptographic keys). The highly hostile environment 
represents a serious challenge for security researchers.  
D. Resource Scarcity 
The extreme resource limitations of sensor devices pose 
considerable challenges to resource-hungry security 
mechanisms. The hardware constraints necessitate extremely 
efficient security algorithms in terms of bandwidth, 
computational complexity, and memory. This is no trivial 
task. Energy is the most precious resource for sensor 
networks. Communication is especially expensive in terms of 
power. Clearly, security mechanisms must give special effort 
to be communication efficient in order to be energy efficient.  
[5] 
E. Immense Scale 
The proposed scale of sensor networks poses a significant 
challenge for security mechanisms. Simply networking tens 
to hundreds of thousands of nodes has proven to be a 
substantial task. Providing security over such a network is 
equally challenging. Security mechanisms must be scalable 
to very large networks while maintaining high computation 
and communication efficiency. 
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F. Unreliable Communication 
Certainly, unreliable communication is another threat to 
sensor security. The security of the network relies heavily on 
a defined protocol, which in turn depends on 
communication.[5] 
• Unreliable Transfer: Normally the packet-based 
routing of the sensor network is connectionless and 
thus inherently unreliable.  
• Conflicts: Even if the channel is reliable, the 
communication may still be unreliable. This is due to 
the broadcast nature of the wireless sensor network.  
• Latency: The multi-hop routing, network congestion 
and node processing can lead to greater latency in 
the network, thus making it difficult to achieve 
synchronization among sensor nodes. 
G. Unattended Operation 
Depending on the function of the particular sensor 
network, the sensor nodes may be left unattended for long 
periods of time. There are three main cautions to unattended 
sensor nodes [5]: 
• Exposure to Physical Attacks: The sensor may be 
deployed in an environment open to adversaries, bad 
weather, and so on. The probability that a sensor 
suffers a physical attack in such an environment is 
therefore much higher than the typical PCs, which is 
located in a secure place and mainly faces attacks 
from a network. 
• Managed Remotely: Remote management of a 
sensor network makes it virtually impossible to 
detect physical tampering and physical maintenance 
issues.  
• No Central Management Point: A sensor network 
should be a distributed network without a central 
management point. This will increase the vitality of 
the sensor network. However, if designed 
incorrectly, it will make the network organization 
difficult, inefficient, and fragile. 
Perhaps most importantly, the longer that a sensor is left 
unattended the more likely that an adversary has 
compromised the node.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The deployment of sensor nodes in an unattended 
environment makes the networks vulnerable. Wireless sensor 
networks are increasingly being used in military, 
environmental, health and commercial applications. Sensor 
networks are inherently different from traditional wired 
networks as well as wireless ad-hoc networks. Security is an 
important feature for the deployment of Wireless Sensor 
Networks. This paper summarizes the attacks and their 
classifications in wireless sensor networks and also an 
attempt has been made to explore the security mechanism 
widely used to handle those attacks. The challenges of 
Wireless Sensor Networks are also briefly discussed. This 
survey will hopefully motivate future researchers to come up 
with smarter and more robust security mechanisms and make 
their network safer. 
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